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Could a Quantum Computer Steal Your Bitcoin in 9 Minutes?

April 18, 2026  ·  updated October 28, 2026  ·  qdayiscoming.com

Not today, and not with any machine that exists. The nine minutes comes from a March 2026 paper by Google Quantum AI with co-authors, including Dan Boneh of Stanford and Justin Drake of the Ethereum Foundation. It describes a future quantum computer that could work out a Bitcoin private key in about nine minutes on average. Bitcoin adds a new block about every ten minutes. That is why the number alarmed the crypto world.

Why Bitcoin is vulnerable

Bitcoin signs payments with ECDSA, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Your private key signs a payment. Your public key lets everyone check the signature. For an ordinary computer, working back from the public key to the private key is practically impossible.

A large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could do it. Think of the public key as a photo of your front-door lock. No locksmith today can cut a key from a photo. A big enough quantum computer could.

The critical window: when you spend, your public key travels with the transaction and waits in a public queue until a block confirms it. The Google paper notes that a new block arrives about every ten minutes on average. An attacker who could find your private key inside that window could try to send your coins elsewhere first. Under the paper's own idealised assumptions, a nine-minute attack would win that race slightly less than 41% of the time.

How can the attack be that fast? The paper explains that a quantum computer could do the first half of the work in advance, before it sees your key. Once your key appears, only the second half is left.

How many qubits would it take?

A qubit is the basic unit of a quantum computer. A physical qubit is one piece of hardware and makes mistakes. A logical qubit is a group of physical qubits that work together as one reliable qubit.

The estimates have fallen fast. In 2021, Webber, Elfving, Weidt and Hensinger estimated that breaking a Bitcoin key within one hour would take about 317 million physical qubits, and about 13 million to do it within a day. The 2026 Google paper puts it at fewer than 1,200 logical qubits. On a superconducting machine, the Google Research blog says that comes to fewer than 500,000 physical qubits, running "in a few minutes". Google calls this an approximately 20-fold reduction in physical qubits.

What has been built is far smaller. In a benchmark by Sandia National Laboratories with Quantinuum and NVIDIA, published in September 2026, the best machine ran error-corrected programs on up to 8 logical qubits. Every estimate, side by side, is in how many qubits it takes to break Bitcoin.

What we do not know: when a machine of that size will exist. Nobody has built one, and these are estimates for hardware that is still on the drawing board.

Which wallets are most at risk?

The risk depends on whether your public key is already visible on the blockchain. Most address types show only a hash of the key until you spend: a short fingerprint that cannot be turned back into the key. Three groups show the key anyway: the oldest pay-to-public-key outputs, Taproot addresses starting with bc1p, and any address you have already sent coins from. The full list is in which Bitcoin addresses are exposed.

The most detailed public estimate comes from Chaincode Labs, a Bitcoin research group, in May 2025. It puts the share at risk at 20 to 50% of all bitcoin, or 4 to 10 million BTC. The oldest pay-to-public-key outputs alone hold about 1.72 million BTC. Those figures are from the May 2025 report; the amounts have shifted since.

Is there a fix?

Bitcoin developers are working on it, but nothing has been adopted yet. One draft proposal, BIP-360 (Pay-to-Merkle-Root), adds a new kind of output designed to resist attacks on keys that have been public for a long time. It does not yet add post-quantum signatures; it prepares for them. Post-quantum signatures are new signature methods built to withstand quantum computers.

The hard part is coordination. A network without a central authority needs broad agreement, years of testing, and millions of owners moving their own coins. Coins whose keys are lost can never be moved. Our article on cold wallets shows how one signed address can expose a whole wallet. How much time is left depends on Q-Day itself; the Q-Day countdown tracks the estimates.

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